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Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Bangladeshi 
 
Civilian control of the armed forces is a sine qua non for democracy. In Bangladesh, the 
military has played a crucial role during several authoritarian setbacks on its path to 
democratic consolidation. Civilian control is understood as the distribution of decision-
making power between civilians and the armed forces. This article sheds light on the 
successes and failures in the efforts of civilian governments to establish supremacy over 
the country’s armed forces in order to consolidate democratic rule. The analysis derives 
from a conceptualization of civilian control that distinguishes five areas of political decision-
making: elite-recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence, and internal 
security. In order to establish control in these various areas civilians have a choice between 
different strategies for which they need certain resources. In this context, the study shows 
that civil-military relations in Bangladesh have tended to be affected by historical legacies. 
Civilian polarisation as well as military factionalism and politicisation have not only 
hampered the institutionalization of civilian control but also led to the predominance of 
informality. 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1991, Bangladesh experienced a transition to democracy after two decades of unstable 
authoritarian regimes including periods of military rule. Three elected governments ruled 
the country until the military intervened in 2007a political crisis and established a non-party 
caretaker government. Until power was ceded to a newly elected government in 2009 the 
armed forces influenced political decision-making. Today, in a highly participative political 
environment Bangladesh has returned to parliamentary democracy that is characterised by 
a ‘quasi-two-party-system’. Even though this democratic system is stable, it is far from 
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being consolidated. A major reason thereof, is the unrestricted struggle between the two 
leading political parties, Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which 
polarise civiliansii into two antagonistic camps. As a result, partisan politics affected political 
institution building which remained fragile and insufficientiii. In addition, this led to a forcibly 
and illicitly politicization of state institutionsiv, in particular the armed forces. This had far-
reaching impacts on the country’s civil-military relations. It is argued that until now no 
government institutionalized civilian control over the armed forces. Despite that prime 
ministers were able to increase their power in decision-making in general over time, civilian 
administrations were not able to avoid military interventions. The high degree of 
polarisation and politicization among the relevant agents has stunted the process of 
institutionalization of civilian control. Especially, the conflict between the BNP and the AL 
have polarized and politicized the armed forces. In order to instrumentalize the military for 
its partisan interests, civilians refrained from establishing an institutionalized civilian 
control, but rather preferred an informal, personalized style of managing and monitoring of 
the armed forces. In this context one can state that the politicisation of the armed forces 
was made possible and enforced by historical factionalism, a legacy of the war of 
independence, which led to a lack of cohesiveness within the military. In consequence, the 
military was either drawn into politics by civilians or the army was reluctant to accept efforts 
to introduce civilian control, because these were often regarded as attempts to dominate 
the armed in support of partisan political purposes. Consequently, neither civilians nor 
military are interested in the institutionalizing of civilian control. Subsequently soldiers felt 
confident and encouraged to intervene in politics in order to solve serious crisis situations 
among civilians, as happened in 2007. Therefore, the armed forces will continue to play an 
important but antithetical political role; claiming to protect Bangladesh’s democracy. 
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Analytical Frameworkv 
 
This study refers to “a consensus in democratization literature that civilian control of the 
military is a conditio sine qua non for democratic consolidation”vi. “Only if democratically 
elected political leaders and their appointed officials control the armed forces can 
democratic rules and processes persist”vii. In line with this argument civil-military relations 
are here understood as the distribution of decision-making power between civilians, 
defined as democratically elected representatives of the people as supreme power, and the 
armed forcesviii.  
In this concept, civilian control marks one pole of a decision-making power continuum, the 
situation in which ‘civilians make all the rules and can change them at any time’ix. Aurel 
Croissant et al. (2010, 2011) define civilian control as that the continuous distribution of 
decision-making power in which civilians alone have the authority to decide on national 
political issues, politics as well as their implementation. Under civilian control, civilians can 
freely choose to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of certain 
policies to the military while the military has no autonomous decision-making power outside 
those areas specifically defined by civilians. In this context, only civilians determine which 
respective policies, or certain policy dimensions, the military implements, and civilians 
alone define the boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation. In addition, 
civilian authorities control sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can—in 
principle—revise their delegations at any timex.xi 
On the other pole of the continuum is the military regime, in which the military controls all 
decisions concerning political structures, processes, and policies and the civilians do not 
possess any autonomous political decision-making power. In this sense, civilian control is a 
relative condition, i.e. it is possible to distinguish various degrees of civilian control (e.g., 
strong or weak, ubiquitous or limited). Challenges to civilian decision-making power can 
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take two analytically distinct shapes: formally institutionalized prerogatives or informal 
contestation. Institutionalized prerogatives describe formal rights by which the military is 
able ‘to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-
military areas within the state-apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the 
state and political or social society’xii”.xiii 
The continuum between civilian and military dominance over decision-making authority can 
be analyzed in five areas: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence, 
and military organization.  
 
Figure 1: Decision-making areas of civil-military relations 
 
Source: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Völkel/Wolf (2011, 78). 
 
The area of elite recruitment refers to the core defining aspects of the political regime, 
namely the rules, criteria and processes of recruiting, selecting and legitimizing the holders 
of political office. Any actor that controls this area is able to define “who rules and who 
decides who rules”xiv. Civilian control over elite recruitment means that the military is 
proscribed from establishing an alternative channel for access to political office, and, 
simultaneously, the processes of elite selection in terms of the formation, working, and end 
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of political leadership are not subject to the explicit consent or implicit acquiescence of the 
military.xv “Civilian control over rules of competition is undermined when public offices are 
excluded from open competition and if the military influences electoral procedures. Civilian 
control over the rules of participation is constrained if active military personnel are eligible 
for public office and soldiers influence the formation and dissolution of government”xvi. 
 
Table 1: Dimensions and indicators of civilian control in the area of elite recruitment 
Dimension Indicator Degree of civilian control 
High Low 
Competition 
for public 
office 
Reserved representation for 
military personnel 
No formal or informal 
guarantees for military 
representation in 
political bodies 
Majority of decisive 
political positions are 
reserved for the military 
 Military influence on the rules 
of political competition 
Military influence on the 
rules of political 
competition 
Military dominates rule 
setting, process and 
outcomes of elite 
selection 
Political 
participation 
Eligibility of active duty military 
officer 
Non-eligibility of active 
duty military officers 
(legally and de facto) 
Eligibility of military 
officers or rules of non-
eligibility are regularly 
ignored 
 Military veto power over 
formation/dissolution of 
governments 
No military influence on 
the making and breaking 
of governments 
Formal regulations 
establish military as veto 
actor or military 
systematically demands a 
tutelary role 
Source: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 957), table is modified by the author. In the original table 
there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included. 
 
Meanwhile, the area of public policy focuses on all policy fields except the narrowly 
understood aspects of security and defence policy. This includes (1) all phases of the 
political decision-making processes, including the identification of political problems to be 
addressed and their transfer into the political system (agenda-setting); the definition of 
policy goals and the elaboration of alternative policies to address these problems (policy 
formulation), and the selection of a concrete policy out of these alternatives (policy 
adoption); and (2) the implementation of these decisions by the administrative agencies of 
the state bureaucracy. “Civilian control over this area means that civilians alone decide on 
the contents, scope, and duration of policy decisions and possess effective means to 
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control and supervise the administrative implementation of these decisions”xvii. However, 
“while all policy issues are important to gauge the degree of civilian control over this area, it 
is particularly relevant if the military has any influence, formal or informal, on the national 
budget”xviii. 
 
Table 2: Dimensions and Indicators of civilian control in the area of Public Policy 
Dimension Indicator Degree of civilian control 
High Low 
Policy-making Military influence on 
state budget 
Neither institutionalized 
nor contestable 
participation in the 
allocation of state 
expenditure (including 
defence/military) 
Military 
dominance over 
budgetary 
process 
 Military influence on 
public policymaking 
(except defence and 
security policy) 
No institutionalized 
prerogatives or informal 
intervention 
Systematic 
exclusion of 
civilians from at 
least one policy 
field 
Policy 
implementation 
Military authority over 
public administration 
No military dominated 
state-in-state structures 
and no military oversight 
of civilian administrative 
authorities 
Civilian 
administrative 
authorities are 
under military 
oversight 
(legally, or de 
facto), or 
significant 
militarized 
parallel 
structures 
Source: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 972-975), table is modified by the author. In the original table 
there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included. 
 
Internal security constitutes a third area of civil-military relations and can be defined in 
terms of two elements. First, it has a geographic element, focusing on the threats 
originating within the realm of one’s states own territory; and second, there is an element 
which is derived from the role and duties of the various state agencies.xix In other words, it 
involves the use of armed forces in a purely domestic environment, which includes public 
order in emergency situations (including disaster relief), preparation for counterinsurgency 
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warfare and terrorism, domestic intelligence gathering, daily policing and border 
controllingxx. “These activities are compatible with civilian control only if civilians have the 
right to make the decisions on the range, duration and frequency of all internal military 
operations as well as the civilian institutions, and are able to monitor their 
implementation”xxi. 
 
Table 3: Dimensions and Indicators of civilian control in the area of Internal Security 
Dimension Indicator Degree of civilian control 
High Low 
Policy-
making 
Military influence in 
internal security 
policymaking 
No institutionalized prerogatives 
or informal intervention 
Systematic exclusion of 
civilians from at least 
one policy field 
Control over 
security 
agents 
Separation of police/other 
security agents and 
military 
Strict separation; no military 
command over internal security 
agents except clearly defined 
(by civilians) emergencies 
Police or other security 
agents subordinate to 
military command or no 
separate police 
 Civilian oversight of 
military internal security 
operations 
Institutional framework in place 
for comprehensive monitor and 
punish military operations; 
military accepts civilian oversight 
No civilian effective 
oversight or 
sanctioning; military de 
facto autonomous in the 
conduct of operations 
Source: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 972-975), table is modified by the author. In the original table 
there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included. 
 
National Defence remains the core function of any military and includes all aspects of 
defence policy, ranging from the development of security doctrines to the deployment of 
troops abroad and conduct of warxxii. Soldiers, as experts in security matters, are often 
involved in the formulation and implementation of national defence policies, even in 
established democracies. Since such policies, especially their implementation, can 
determine the security of the nation, it is crucial that they remain under civilian jurisdiction 
and oversight. Furthermore, all national defence activities can only be compatible with 
civilian supremacy where civilians control the range, duration and frequency of these 
missions and related activities. Additionally, the civilian institutions must be able to 
effectively oversee the armed forces’ implementation of national defence and security 
policies and to monitor the military’s external security missions.xxiii 
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Table 4: Dimensions and Indicators of civilian control in the area of National Defence 
Dimension Indicator Degree of civilian control 
High Low 
Policy-making Civilian influence 
on defence 
policing 
Institutionalized civilian dominance 
over defence policy and active day-to-
day participation of civilians in 
defence policy-making; military 
accepts civilian’s policy prerogative 
Civilians are 
systematically excluded 
from decision-making 
Policy 
implementation 
Civilian oversight 
of military defence 
activities 
Civilians of all branches of 
government are able to monitor 
military activities 
Military is not subject to 
civilian monitoring and 
sanctioning 
Source: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 972-975), table is modified by the author. In the original table 
there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included. 
 
Finally, the area of military organization comprises decisions on all organizational aspects 
of the military as an institution, which can be organized into two dimensions. The first 
dimension refers to the material aspects or “hardware” of military organization: force, size 
and structure, procurement and production of military equipment, as well as other 
institutional, financial and technological resources of the military. The second dimension 
(“software”), includes the ideational aspects of military organization (e.g. doctrine and 
education); and decisions on personnel selection such as recruitment, appointment and 
retirementxxiv. Measures of the level of civilian control over this area relate to the extent of 
civilians’ power to decide on the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ of armed forces organization, 
and the extent to which civilians can set the boundaries of military autonomy in deciding on 
these armed forces-internal affairs”xxv.  
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Table 5: Dimensions and Indicators of civilian control in the area of Military 
Organization 
Dimension Indicator Degree of civilian control 
High Low 
‘Hardware’ of 
military 
organization 
Civilian influence 
in decisions on 
military ‘hardware’ 
Civilians have full authority about 
decisions of military organization; the 
military implements civilian decisions 
Military hardware is 
under military control; 
military draws the line 
between civilian and 
military decision-
making authority 
‘Software’ of 
military 
organization 
Civilian influence 
on military 
‘software’ 
Civilians set the rules of conduct, the 
limits of military autonomy and 
provide the guidelines for ‘corporate 
identity’ of the armed forces 
Military defines the 
limits of military 
autonomy and ignores 
civilian guidelines; the 
corporate culture is 
distinct from the civilian 
society and the military 
aims to preserve its 
distinctiveness 
Source: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Wolf (2010, 972-975), table is modified by the author. In the original table 
there is a third degree of civilian control – Medium – included. 
 
Keeping this five dimensional framework in mind, one can state that establishing civilian 
control of the military is a significant challenge for many new democracies in which it 
remains contested. In this context this study argues “that establishing civilian control during 
processes of democratic transition and consolidation implies a change in the institutional 
setup which governs civil-military relations”xxvi. Such an “institutional change and 
entrenchment of civilian control can only be achieved if civilians (change agents) are 
capable of neutralizing and reversing the mechanisms which keep the existing institutional 
structure stable (Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Völkel/Wolf, 2011, 85). To do so, they can 
choose between the following strategies ranging from robust (coercive) to weak (non-
intrusive) on a gliding scale.  
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Table 6: Mechanisms and strategies of civil-military change 
Robust  Weak 
Sanctioning Ascriptive Selection Appeasement 
Counterbalancing Political Socialization Acquiescence 
Monitoring  Appreciation 
Source: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Völkel/Wolf (2011, 85). The table is modified by the author. The original 
table contains a categorization of the strategies according to three mechanisms of change – compensation 
(weak strategies), legitimization and power (robust strategies). 
 
It is important to note that in order for civilians to be able to successfully implement specific 
strategies of control over the armed forces, they must have sufficient resources: more 
robust strategies are more demanding in terms of available resources than weaker 
strategies. Furthermore, civilians deploy ‘resources’ and modify their behavior in response 
to changing situations and access of resources. Simultaneously, civilian choices and 
strategies, by affecting the status quo in civil-military relations, may also change structures, 
thereby creating new resources, improving or wasting available resources and 
transforming the repertoire of strategies for future action by the same or following 
generations of agents (actors). 
 
In line with the conceptual and theoretical framework of Croissant et al. (2011, 2010, 2009) 
(see figure 2), this paper “[delineates] three sets of factors that provide resources for 
civilian action and which either enable or limit the use of certain strategies: (1) macro-
structural factors, including levels of socioeconomic modernization, the internal ‘threat 
environment,’ and structures of international politics. The establishment of civilian control is 
more likely to take root when democracy has achieved broad and deep legitimacy among 
both the mass public and civilian elite, favoring social and economic conditions and the 
absence of internal threats, unrest which is threatening the integrity of state and nation (2). 
Cultural variables/factors, especially (1) the military’s self-identity and (2) political culture. 
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“They shape the understanding of civilians and soldiers regarding what is legitimate and 
acceptable behavior; provide a resource for civilians to legitimize their approach to gain 
control over the military; or enable the military to justify its political role and influence. (3) 
Institutional factors, e.g. the cohesiveness of civilian and military actors affects the ability of 
civilians to change the status quo of civil-military relations”. 
 
Figure 2: 
 
Source: Croissant/Kühn/Chambers/Völkel/Wolf (2011, 91) 
 
To sum up, when democratically elected civilian governments want to establish control over 
the armed forces, they can choose from a menu of different control strategies. Their 
success, in other words the degree of achieved institutional change, depends on the 
adequacy of the chosen set of robust and/or weak strategies in the context of the 
availability of necessary, sufficient resources. However, no key actor in civil-military 
relations in a historical or social vacuumxxvii, therefore the choices and strategies of the 
civilians depend on concrete contextual circumstances that condition and influence the 
possibilities for actionxxviii.  
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Civil-Military Relations during authoritarian regimes 1972-1990 
 
The history of civil-military relations in Bangladesh (former East-Pakistan) has been 
determined by the way in which the country came into existence. The war of liberation, 
especially its guerrilla style, and the induction of the whole society into the armed struggle 
against West Pakistan led to an intermingling of civilian and military spheres. This liaison 
had far reaching consequences for the armed forces. The ’Bangladeshi regular forces’xxix, 
drawn into a highly politicized environment of a civil war, started to absorb socio-political 
conflicts, creating factions within the military. Therefore, after independence was achieved 
in 1971 Bangladesh did not inherit a united militaryxxx- a phenomenon which got further 
entrenched during the first civilian administration from 1972 until 1975.  
Most significant was the confrontation between the ‘freedom fighters’ and those which 
joined Bangladesh as ‘repatriates’ from West Pakistan after the strugglexxxi. This societal 
conflict gained momentum in the formation of the new Bangladesh Armed Forces (BAF). 
Being aware of the tensions between both sections within the society, the civilian 
government tried to utilise this by granting the ‘freedom fighters’ more favourable 
treatments, benefits and privileges than to the ‘repatriates’ in the military. They also 
became entrusted with senior posts within the militaryxxxii. Nevertheless, at the same time 
civilians made sure that there was a numerical superiority of the ‘repatriates’xxxiii to balance 
the ‘freedom fighters’ in the armed forces. Consequently, military cohesiveness became 
further disturbed which led to a permanent struggle to outbid the rival faction.  
However, several other societal cleavages resonated in the armed forces, which only 
further deepened factionalism among the soldiers and challenged the self-identity of the 
armed forces. These issues included, for example, the questions about what kind of 
economic system was to be adopted, which attitude towards China or Moscow in the Cold 
War , what role religion should play, which led to the appearance of some militant rightist 
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groups, as well as to the emergence of numerous socialist and communist segments. A 
trend that also became apparent in military affairs, for example through the appearance of 
numerous leftists’ cells within the armed forces. Subsequently, conservative soldiers 
(especially the repatriates) were challenging leftist soldiers’ notion that the military should 
take part in economic and development activities. This would also include a political role for 
the soldiersxxxiv. Instead, the conservative soldiers promoted the concept of an apolitical 
standing army, focusing exclusively on defence and security mattersxxxv. Despite the fact 
that these leftists’ elements got literally eliminated in the following years, the underlying 
socio-political conflicts got gripped by the confrontation between ‘freedom fighters’ and 
‘repatriates’, creating increasingly debates over the role of the army in politics.  
Having this as well as the experience of the military rules during the Pakistani period 
(1947-1971) in mind, the major aim of civilians was to keep the army week and 
factionalised. In order to gain control, the first government tried to counterbalance the 
military in two ways: directly through the creation of paramilitary forcesxxxvi to such an 
extent that the regular forces were outnumbered by them. Indirectly, by neglecting military 
needs and reducing the defence budgetxxxvii that gained momentum because the military 
was hindered by insufficient equipment and war-torn infrastructure. In order to make the 
military subservient, civilians appointed loyal officers in senior positions by ignoring military 
hierarchies. However, the attempt to gain leverage over the military failed because of 
several factors, e.g. worsening of internal security, socio-economic deterioration, 
corruption, and natural catastrophes. Most important is that it became obvious that factors 
favouring civilians, especially an electoral mandatexxxviii and the image as father of the 
nation of its first Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman, lost their momentum. Initially they helped 
to maintain cohesiveness among civilians by bridging the various factions emerging from 
the increasing polarisation. Subsequently civilians were able to instrumentalize socio-
political cleavages imposed on the armed forces and to enforce factionalism among the 
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soldiers. But due to maladministration and an emerging authoritarian style, like the creation 
of a one-party-systemxxxix, militant resistance among the people against the government 
was growing. To ensure law and order in the entire country, the government deployed not 
only the paramilitary but the regular forces too. The successful aid-to-civil-authorities 
missions improved the military’s esprit de corps and created in it a self-perception as sole 
saviour of the nationxl. The armed forces appeared to sections of the general public, 
especially to the rising middle class, and soldiers as an alternative to the governmentxli, 
polarising the country for or against Mujibur.  
In consequence, in August, 1975 a group of young officers felt confident to take over direct 
power. The subsequent assassination of Mujibur further increased tensions between the 
pro-Mujibur ‘freedom fighters’ and the anti-Mujibur ‘repatriates’xlii and their supporters 
among the armed forces as well as the civilians. Additionally, this deepened conflict 
between the respective, diametric civilian and military camps (i.e. pro-Mujibur civilians 
against anti-Mujibur soldiers). As a result, coups and countercoups occurred, carried out by 
the antagonistic factions within the armed forcesxliii and encouraged by their respective 
civilian counterparts.  
However, in November 1975 Gen. Ziuar Rahman was able to assert power during this 
political imbroglio. To be able to consolidate his regime, he had to make the soldiers less 
vulnerable towards politicization and polarisation, e.g. through enforcing cohesiveness by 
dislodging the leftist elements and granting soldiers socio-economic benefits. As a freedom 
fighter, enhancing the professionalism of the Bangladesh military he was respected by the 
repatriates. As such, he bridged the two factions (‘freedom fighters’/’repatriates’) and 
provided a stable military government, at least temporarily. Furthermore, to strengthen the 
military vis-a-vis civilians, he excluded the latter from political decision-making, especially 
by the induction of soldiers into the administrative structurexliv. Subsequently, military 
command structure became the most significant mechanism in decision-makingxlv, not only 
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in public policyxlvi. To ensure armed forces dominance in internal security and national 
defence, he disbanded civilian paramilitary forces. To gain control over elite recruitment, 
Rahman founded the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). The conflict between ‘freedom 
fighters’ and ‘repatriates’, which divided the civilians as well as the soldiers founded, had 
now become institutionalised in a highly diametrical two-party-dominance-system, the AL 
vs. BNP. In this context, President General Ziaur Rahman’s policies alienated the AL and 
the ‘freedom fighters’, one of whom eventually assassinated him in May 1981. However, 
the ‘repatriates’ were able to gain control under General Hussain Muhammad Ershad. To 
avoid reluctance against his rule he tried to minimize the role of freedom fighters within the 
armed forces. Under his rule, the military further entrenched its dominance in all decision-
making areas. He not only continued Ziaur’s policy of systematic deployment of military 
officials in the civilian administrationxlvii but also enforced the institutionalization of the 
army’s political role. For example, he introduced a quota-system for military officers in 
civilian postsxlviii. More importantly, the reduction of factionalism helped the military to 
maintain control over all decision making-areas. However, due to increasing civilian 
resistance and the loss of foreign support, General Ershad was forced to resign in 
December 1990. 
 
Civil-Military Relations after the Re-introduction of Parliamentary Democracy in 1991  
Generally the post 1990 phase can be divided into three periods: First, the phase of three 
civilian governments, 1996-2006xlix; second, military-backed non-party caretaker 
governments, 2006-2008; third, the AL-government from 2009-until today. 
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Civilian Governments between 1991 and 2006: Emergence of Civilian Control 
 
Confronted with a mass upheaval, General Ershad gave up power. Subsequently elections 
without military interference were held and democratic rule was restored. To achieve this, 
civilians immediately started several measures to gain control over the armed forcesl. The 
presidential form of government was transformed into a parliamentary system li. This 
strengthened not only the parliament but also the prime minister vis-à-vis the president 
which until then helped to operationalize direct influence and formal role in politics for the 
military. Additionally the prime minister, being the real chief executive, turned into the de 
facto supreme commander. In contrast, the office of the president, still the formal head of 
the armed forces, lost its control over military affairs and carried out only ceremonial 
functionslii. As such, civilians were able to subordinate the important Armed Forces Division 
(AFD) under the office of the prime ministerliii. This has gained momentum, since the AFD 
(originated from the Supreme Command Division) is the primary body to coordinate all 
three services (navy, army and air force) and provides assistance to governments 
regarding all matters of military affairs like strategic initiatives, the posting and promotion of 
senior officers, procurements, movements and mobilization of units and etc. (Pattaniak 
2008, 981, 994). Furthermore, during the former authoritarian era, the AFD, staffed with 
armed forces personnel, was not only used by General Ziuar and General Ershad to 
manage the armed forces but also to monitor factionalism among soldiers and 
subsequently to detect potential coups threatsliv. The civilians of post-1990 were able to 
use the AFD effectively for similar purposes. For example, the then interim-government 
detected a coup attempt in 1996 of Lieutenant General Nasim and was able to mobilize 
enough loyal troops to isolate the rebellious military faction and maintain civilian control. 
Thus, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Nasim, was replaced. In addition, all prime ministers 
during this period asserted the portfolio of defence and took charge of the Ministry of 
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Defence (MoD). This offered the governments another instrument of oversight, at least, 
regarding civilian-administrative aspects of military hardwarelv. In this context one has to 
state, that the power and role of the MoD -lacking also sufficient funds, personnel and 
expertise- has been substantively reduced during military rule. This trend continued under 
civilian administrations. Nevertheless, given that the prime minister, as de facto supreme 
commander and acting defence minister who asserted power over the AFD (as leading 
authority for higher defence organisation)lvi, civilians were able to establish formal civilian 
control in military organisation and national defence. As an outcome of this, the Defence 
Committee actively made efforts to establish civilian authority over defence matters by 
questioning and evaluating defence policies and purchases.lvii Also, for the first time, 
defence expenditures were discussed and investigations were carried out which led to the 
detection of several misappropriations of the defence budget, particularly regarding 
inconsistencies in the purchase procedures (D. Choudhury, 2009).lviii Furthermore, the 
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) started to report directly to the defence 
minister. Since the defence portfolio was asserted by the prime minister, the civilian 
governments were able to control the DGFI. The fact that the DGFI became active against 
military personnel is an important indication of the increase in civilian controllix. But two 
major challenges towards the institutionalization of civilian control still remained. 
First, due to the lack of civilian efforts to formulate a defence policy and expertise, the 
governments depended exclusively on military proposals. Because of this, soldiers 
succeeded in influencing all relevant matters regarding military organization and national 
defence and related policy fields through the AFD. For example, the military resisted 
security ties with India and its axis with the Sovietslx. Consequently, civilians adopted an 
anti-India bias and voiced objections against security and military cooperation with India, 
e.g. defence purchaseslxi. This marks a significant limitation of the government’s authority 
in foreign policy. Furthermore, due to the way in which the police and paramilitary forces 
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are organized (e.g. Rapid Action Battalion/RAB and Bangladesh Border Rifles/BDR), 
substantial parts of officers and rank and files are recruited from the regular military. 
Although these units must formally follow the directives of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MHA), they came under the influence of the armed forces. This occurred because the 
deployed soldiers in the respective security forces maintained a relationship with the armed 
forces, which was derived from loyalty and dependence. As a result, the effectiveness of 
the AFD and the MHA to exercise civilian control was reduced. This had serious 
implications for civil-military relations regarding internal security. Although the armed forces 
have been less assertive after the restoration of democracy in the context of law and order 
situations,lxii they tended to act autonomously and challenge civilian supremacy. For 
example, as the civilian government signed a peace agreement in 1997 with rebels in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts to end the country’s greatest internal armed conflict since its 
existencelxiii, the military still maintained total control and sidelined civilians from decision 
making in that region. Also, the government’s inability to monitor military activities 
(especially human rights abuses) during Operation Clean-Heartlxiv or the foundation of RAB 
(2004) and the subsequent recruitment policy shows that civilians made decisions but were 
unable to exert control over policy implementation. Therefore, civilian control in internal 
security was only partly established. 
Second, an institutional set-up was created which allowed the prime minister to act 
independently from other civilian authoritieslxv and directly with the COAS.lxvi How far the 
military can exercise influence depends heavily on personal relationships favouring the 
position of the prime minister. Nevertheless, this civil-military interaction is featured by a 
lack of transparency and accountability. In this context, one can state that neither the AL 
nor the BNP administrations attempted to challenge the exclusive position of the 
‘militarised’ AFD, disadvantaging the civilian MoD.lxvii  
In order to create a channel to instrumentalize the military for partisan purposes, the 
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respective government preferred to enforce a personalised mechanism to oversee the 
military. Therefore, the inherited institutional structure based on the imbalance between the 
AFD and MoD seemed to be favourable to civilians. Subsequently, the AFD further 
asserted the power of the MoD. In this context, it became apparent that civilian 
governments were willing to accept the status quo and are not pushing the process of 
further institutionalization. In other words, civilians preferred centralization instead of 
diversification and extension of the institutional structure to entrench individual control 
mechanism. For example, there are allegations that prime ministers influenced the 
monitoring activities of the Defence Committee in order to achieve personal leverage over 
military affairs. Subsequently the achievements of this body appeared to some observers 
to be limitedlxviii.  
To sum up, all the steps undertaken by the civilian governments have marked a shift of 
power from the military to the civilians. But the lacunae in institutionalization of civilian 
control, created through concerns to personalise control mechanism in order to 
instrumentalize them for partisan interests, had a significant impact on the chosen 
strategies to establish civilian control.  
 
Strategies 
 
In order to use the AFD as an instrument of control, civilians applied sanctioning, ascriptive 
selection, appeasement, and acquiescence. The focal point of all measures was the 
appointment process of the top brass, especially army chief, principal staff officer (PSO) 
and the director general of the field intelligence (DGFI)”lxix. In this context, officers critical of 
the government were sanctioned by being pressured into retirement, (illegally) dismissed 
or deployed in remote areas and/or at insignificant posts. For example, due to political 
grievances in 2001 all three service chiefs were retired without reason and new ones 
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appointedlxx. In contrast, politically loyal and trusted senior officers were selected and 
received promotions (e.g. General Moeen U Ahmed, identified as an AL supporter, was 
made COAS), and were placed in lucrative key positions.lxxi Loyalty was not interpreted as 
subordination to civilian authority but as allegiance to a certain political party and its 
respective leader. In consequence, political preferences led to promotion and immediately 
after a change in government to dismissal or unfavourable postings.  
In avoiding resistance by the military, which felt provoked by such actions, civilians tried to 
appease soldiers by keeping certain military interests satisfiedlxxii. This appeared in the 
following forms: (1) substantial measures to modernize the militarylxxiii; (2) persistent 
increase of defence expenditures; (3) granting officers (retired or activelxxiv) key positions in 
administration, and (semi) governmental organizationslxxv; (3) extraordinary promotions 
within the military structure; (4) safeguarding military’s corporate interests, e.g. promoting 
peacekeeping operations or accommodating military business activities (or self-financing). 
To win the support from the army, they appreciated the role of military forces in restoring 
democracy in 1990 and helping civil administration in crisis periodslxxvi. They also attended 
exercises and military ceremonies on a regular baselxxvii. 
To strengthen its position in internal security, civilians try to counterbalance the Army by 
forming the RAB in 2004, subordinated to the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, since the 
most of them were recruited from the army, the government did not gain much 
independence from soldiers.  
However, the chosen strategy mix proved to be only partly effective since it provoked at 
least two times military reluctance towards civilian control. Indeed, in the context of the 
abortive coup attempt in 1996, this was launched because the CASlxxviii/COAS was not 
willing to follow the order to sack two top ranking officers because of the involvement with 
the AL. However, civilians continued this pollicisation of the military and Nasim was 
replaced by a BNP supporter--General Mahbubur Rahmanlxxix. 
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Resources 
 
Generally, the 1990 democratic transition was made possible by two factors: First of all, the 
political awareness and pro-democratic attitude among the general publiclxxx. Despite deep 
polarisation of society and rivalry between the leading political parties, the Bengali people, 
most notably students, labour unions, media etc., forced the political parties’ leadership to 
build a national consensus and to form an alliance against military rule. Second, the 
deterioration of the economy created a demand for a change in government: from military 
to civilian. Facing economic decline and a series of austerity measures that were unequally 
divided over the population, coupled with the allegation of widespread corruption and 
incessant patron-client relationships, the depressed popular majority turned against the 
ruling military establishment. The combination of these two factors paved the way for the 
12th constitutional amendment, which re-introduced of a parliamentary system of 
governancelxxxi, and included the prime minister’s formal control over the military.  
However, over time the resources turned against civilians. Despite the fact that the 
governments achieved respectable economic growth (ca. 5-6 per cent annually), socio-
economic inequalities (e.g. gender, region, minorities) were further deepened and the 
majority did not benefit from this boomlxxxii. This phenomenon enforced a major obstacle 
which hindered the government from establishing civilian control.. Besides basic 
‘democratic enthusiasm’, this factor can be described as (1) a lack of tolerance; (2) a 
reciprocal mistrust between the major political actors, not only between civilians and 
military but especially between leading political parties and their respective sympathizers 
among the armed forceslxxxiii; (3) an unrestricted political struggle to undermine the political 
opponent, either in government or in opposition; (4) the use of violence to express and 
suppress political protests; (5) no political parties’ acceptance of parliamentarianism, e.g. 
boycott of the parliament and street politics resulting in nationwide strikes and non-
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cooperation movements (hartal/bandhs). As such, civilians were unable to establish and 
consolidate an effective and functioning democratic order, resulting in a crisis and civil-war-
like scenario. Additionally, the perceived incompetence of politicians to deliver good 
governance convinced the military that it was the only organization that could effectively 
guard the nation. This created the notion that the armed forces had to undertake a political 
role to protect the ‘idea of democracy’ which was discredited by corrupt and incompetent 
civilians. This development found its peak in late 2006 as the army decided to seize 
control. However, international actors intervened to demonstrate their disapproval of any 
direct military takeover and this appeared to have some positive ramifications in 
maintaining some sort of civilian rule in the country. Foreign donors were increasingly 
linking financial aid and participation in lucrative peacekeeping with democratization. This 
threat proved effective, since the armed forces preferred to be a subservient agent of 
civilian governments in order not to lose UN missions. This apparently convinced the 
armed forces not to assert direct powerlxxxiv but establish a form of power sharing between 
themselves and the civilians, leading to the establishment of the caretaker government of 
2007-2009. 
To sum up, initially—at the beginning of the post-1991 democratisation period—civilians 
succeeded in establishing formal control over the military, although informal influence by 
the armed forces remained. However, civilian governments were unable to totally enforce 
civilian supremacy and in consequence failed to consolidate the democratic process. The 
politicization of promotions and appointments led to increasing reluctance towards civilian 
control among the officers. Therefore the centralization of decision-making through the 
AFD has not resulted in effective civilian control over the armed forces. “Rather it has 
politicized the military“lxxxv. In consequence, due to the enforced factionalism, civilians were 
able to repel the 1996 coup attempt. Nevertheless, at the end of this period in 2007, the 
armed forces asserted its former dominant role in politics. Ultimately, one of the major aims 
25 
of the 2007-2009 military involvement in politics was to vanquish undue civilian 
interference into internal military affairs.  
 
The caretaker government of 2007-2009: Military Dominance 
 
Although there was no direct military takeover, during the period from 11 January 2006 until 
6 January 2009, when an AL administration held power, there was no civilian control. This 
is because of the absence of an elected government or it’s legally/constitutionally acting 
substitute. A peculiarity of the Constitution of Bangladesh is the provision of holding 
general elections under a neutral, non-party caretaker governmentlxxxvi. Regarding the 13th 
amendment, the government, at the end of its tenure, rather than going into a caretaker 
mode (‘full empowered interim government’) have to hand over power to a non-party 
caretaker government to assist the Bangladesh Elections Commission (BEC) in ensuring 
free and fair national elections within 90 dayslxxxvii. However, since its introductionlxxxviii, 
political parties, due to the excessive politicisation of the country’s institutions, have 
recurrently been in conflict with each other over the formation of these caretaker 
governmentslxxxix. In 2006 this led to extra-ordinary violent confrontation between AL and 
BNP supporters paralyzing the political systemxc. Consequently, under the directives of the 
military,xci the first caretaker government of 2006 (Iajuddin Ahmed) which faced harsh 
political resistance, was forced to resign, the scheduled elections were postponed 
indefinitely, and a second caretaker government under Chief Adviserxcii Fakhruddin Ahmed 
was installedxciii. These two facts, that this government was set up under a state of 
emergency - which continued until briefly before the national elections were held in 
December 2008xciv - and that the almost two-year tenure royally exceeded the 
constitutional limit of 90 days, provided Ahmed’s administration with significant powers. 
This was especially gaining momentum since Fakhruddin was not acting like the head of a 
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caretaker government, taking key decisions concerning all kinds of crucial policy mattersxcv 
which were beyond the constitutional mandate. The reality that the armed forces formed 
this government proves that there was no institutionalized control over the military in elite 
recruitment and that this government was dependent on the support of the armed forces 
which was given significant powers in all decision-making areas. Therefore, Bangladesh 
became “a de-facto military controlled state”xcvi. This became evident in several measures 
and proposals by the top brass. Most notably has been COAS Moeen U. Ahamed’s 
understanding on why the Westminster parliamentary type of democracy in Bangladesh 
failed resulting in his suggested solution of forming a new political leadership. According to 
Moeen, Bangladesh’s democracy has to be reviewed and the constitution has to be revised 
(Rahman, 2008, 15). Therefore, he promoted the idea of a balanced power-sharing 
arrangement between the president and prime minister which included the notion that the 
president reserves the right to dismiss the elected prime minister and his cabinet as well as 
to dissolve the government. In consequence, this would revoke the achievements 
regarding formal civilian control realised after the fall of Ershad, e.g. the establishment of a 
parliamentary system.  
Moeen proclaimed that Bangladesh has to develop its own brand of democracy to 
overcome the country’s poor governance: “We cannot go back to an elective democracy 
where corruption in society becomes pervasive, government suffers in terms of security 
and violation of rights and where political criminalisation flattens the very survival and 
integrity of the state”xcvii. Therefore the country has not only to build a new democratic 
system but also it needs a “new leadership at all levels”xcviii. To make a new leadership 
emerge, “power must be balanced, not tilted towards any family and dynasty”xcix.  
In order to operationalize COAS Moeen’s vision, it was vital that the military gained 
decision-making power in internal security. Subsequently, special acts were passed, e.g. 
Emergency Powers Ordinance 2007 (EPO) and Emergency Powers Rules (EPR), which 
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granted the military extraordinary powers and impunity and led to the suspension of 
numerous fundamental rights as freedom of movement, association, expression and 
assemblyc. In consequence, normal political activities were criminalized and public access 
to information became limitedci. Furthermore, the armed forces gained control over all 
security forces, since all other security forces, e.g. BDR, RAB, Police, as well as the 
intelligence agencies operated as joint forces under the leadership of the military. These 
are clear indications that, with Fakhruddin’s assumption of office, the “military was given 
power and responsibility for maintaining law and order in the country”cii, leading to military 
dominance in internal security.  
Regarding Military Organisation and National Defence one has to note, though the defence 
ministry under the constitution became subordinated to the president, real power over it 
remained with the caretaker government. Given its dependence on the military’s good will 
to remain in officeciii, the president did not exercise his powers to challenge the support of 
the caretaker government for the armed forcesciv. Thus, the armed forces regained its 
influence over the DGFI, which functioned as a proxy for the armed forces in decision-
making and in cooperating with the caretaker government. As such, the DGFI became not 
only the main driving force behind the government but also the prime decision-maker with 
almost the “final say on anything the CTG does”cv. Both, COAS Moeen and DGFI chief 
Major General Golam Mohammed did not hesitate to take a public stance on national 
issues and policiescvi. Furthermore, the strong influence of the army in decision-making in 
these areas can be seen in the extraordinary growth of the defence budget for 2008-09. 
With close to a billion dollar (Tk 64.08 billion or US$ 934 million), it was not only 10 billion 
Takas more than in 2007 and 2008 but it marked also the highest defence allocation in the 
entire history of the countrycvii. At the same time this ignored necessary allocations for other 
state institutions like the judiciarycviii. Another hint for strong soldiers’ influence in military 
organisation is the upgrade of the post of the CAS/COAS from a three-star to a four-star 
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general, and the subsequent promotion of subordinate officerscix.cx Furthermore, several 
retired and active officers were appointed to higher offices in the government and in 
various public sector institutionscxi. 
However, the use of the DGFI indicates that the military preferred not to become directly 
involved in politics. But the armed forces still tried to establish an institutional role for 
themselves, ensuring that they would have an effective political voice. Therefore, the DGFI 
facilitated the creation of new institutions, e.g. in March 2007 ‘National Coordination 
Committee to Combat Corruption and Serious Crimes’ (NCC), in order to build a new 
political leadership. To ensure the influence of the army, the DGFI placed active-duty and 
retired military officers in senior posts. For example, all general officers commanding 
(GOCs) were members of the NCC which was headed by a Major General of the Armed 
Forces. Furthermore the NCC office was set up at the army’s headquarterscxii. In fact this 
can be seen as an indicator for the strong influence of the armed forces on the NCC and 
the imbalance of power between military and caretaker government. Similar processes 
happened not only in the NCC but in other eminent political bodies too, like the Election 
Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). The latter was headed by a 
retired army chief.  
In the absence of an elected prime minister, a dysfunctional presidency, and the fact that 
the military-controlled NCC supervised (and commanding) all law-enforcing agencies and 
was entrusted with special powers over other state agencies, civilian control over the 
military and security-related public policy issues has appeared to be a total misnomer. This 
includes non-security related public policy. For example, the caretaker government granted 
the military increased influence over business activities compared to previous civilian 
governments, e.g. in 2007 the military took over management of Bangladesh Diesel Plant 
Ltd and 2008 the state-owned enterprise North Bengal Paper Mill. Furthermore, the army 
gained leverage in certain lucrative civilian sectors such as the distribution of basic victuals 
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at ‘fair prices’ (daal bhaat) or the Biman Bangladesh Airlines Limitedcxiii. 
There is no doubt that the activities of the NCC, ACC and Election Commission under the 
guidance of the DGFI aimed to prepare the ground for a civilian leadership change in the 
context of the elections in preparation. Therefore, they attempted the following strategy: 
First, to expel the two leaders Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajed from the 
country, described as Minus-Two-Formula; second, to replace the senior leadership of their 
respective parties by a second or more junior generation. Third, to replace “old” political 
parties by creating new ones, e.g. with the help of Nobel Laureate Dr. Mohammed Yunus it 
was intended to build the Nagorik Sakti (Citizens Power). However, due to the lack of 
support from society for an uncertain third force and the strong linkages of the well-
established BNP and AL with their supporters at the grassroots level, the military failedcxiv. 
Fourth, via the Election Commission, several electoral regulations were issued. For 
example, a new system for registering of political parties was introduced, which had a 
significant impact on the ability of political parties to take part in electoral competition. Due 
to various requirements like the improvement of intra-party democracy and transparency, 
the number of parties able to take part was reduced from around one hundred to thirty-
eight. Another measure was the redrawing of boundaries of close to 45% of the electoral 
constituencies affecting the electoral prospects of parties. The most crucial activity, carried 
out directly by the military, was the producing of a reliable voters’ list (which included the 
elimination of 12 million fake voters) and the introduction of a national identity card to avoid 
electoral fraudcxv.cxvi Fifth, an anti-corruption drive was inaugurated. Due to the fact that 
plans to exile Hasina and Zia did not work out, the NCC used corruption charges to remove 
them from the political landscapecxvii. Therefore, the joint forces launched a clean-up 
operation against the party organisation of both, the AL and the BNP. The plan was to 
break down the power base of Hasina and Zia in order to marginalise them in the political 
landscape of Bangladeshcxviii. 
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To sum up, when the military intervened at a time of the deepest political crisis after 1990 
to “protect democratic norms” it was initially welcomed by civil societycxix. In order to avoid 
isolation and condemnationcxx by Bangladesh’s donors, a power-sharing agreement 
between the military and technocrats (non-elected civilians) was arranged and negotiated 
with the international community, including an extra-constitutional two-year window. 
However, besides some positively perceived achievements (e.g. ID cards and fixed voters 
lists) the caretaker government failed to achieve most of its major aims. This was because 
of consumer price inflationcxxi, national catastrophes, and external shocks like the economic 
crisis of 2008 which put pressure on the regime. In consequence, the society, political 
parties and their support bases (especially associated student, youth and labor 
organizations) were increasingly demanding the return to electoral democracy and the 
restoration of civilian rulecxxii. This was an essential change, since until then no one really 
opposed the caretakerscxxiii. Additionally, the judiciary felt encouraged to start challenging 
the caretakers’ legitimacy. The frequent outbursts of popular anger furthermore forced 
external actors to promote elections without any further delays, the withdrawal of the state 
of emergency and to distance themselves from the military-backed governmentcxxiv. Also, 
the soldiers’ co-opted sections of society (like business people/industrialist or media) were 
withdrawing their support. Differences between the election commission and the army were 
emerging, e.g. about the scheduling of the elections. Ultimately, it was increasingly difficult 
to implement reforms, most obvious in the failed attempt to create a National Security 
Councilcxxv. A successful implementation would define the most far-reaching institutional 
role in the country’s decision-making process for the military. But serious concerns among 
politicians, civil society and media about potential ambitions of the COAS to assume the 
office of president and as such be in charge of the most significant decision-making body 
for all security-related issues, raised vehement resistance against this proposal. The fact 
that the caretaker government supported this idea aggravated such criticism. 
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Consequently, the COAS had to give up this idea. Realizing that the caretaker 
administration was not, following its initial period in power, able to attract any real domestic 
and international appeal, at the end of 2008, the armed forces reluctantly gave in to new 
elections.  
 
Post 2008: Re-Emergence of Civilian Control 
 
In early 2009, it appeared that the ‘pre-caretaker government political situation’ of 1991-
2006 had resurrected. Civilian rule with an elected prime minister as head of government 
was again established. Obviously, the 2008 elections showed that the political parties 
turned towards the old patterns of their intense rivalry, especially regarding their attempts 
to seek the support of the armed forces in their competition for power. For example, 
political parties continued to induct retired army officers into their parties for 
campaigningcxxvi and to build-up informal networks with the soldiers.cxxvii Subsequently, this 
increased the involvement of the armed forces in party politics as well as electoral 
matterscxxviii, e.g. manipulating the media through the DGFI in order to support preferred 
candidatescxxix. However, the majority of the electoral candidates were from civilian interest 
groups like businessmen, industrialists, lawyers or landlords, and only 5 per cent were 
former officers in the 2008 electionscxxx. Furthermore, because of the very personalized 
and dynastic political party structures, the armed forces did not gain much leverage over 
political parties through retired military candidates and the nomination process. But more 
important is that it seems that there has been a fundamental change in the relationship 
between the military and political parties. Besides the respective political preferences 
among officers and rank and file, the armed forces as an institution at least initially 
attempted to stay neutral within the political rivalry between the AL and BNP after 1991. 
This became increasingly difficult and resulted in the politicisation of the entire military 
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institution. Consequently, the armed forces, in the most recent caretaker government, tried 
to set conditions which would make it impossible for political parties to utilize or build up 
military internal factions for future political purposes. This attempt failed. The armed forces 
were not able to break the power of civilians and establish sustainable military dominance, 
and withdraw. As a result, besides the fact that the rules and procedures for the 2008 
election where yet set by a military-backed government, according to international 
observers, the elections were free and fair. However, since 2008, in the context of the 
absolute electoral mandate for one party, it appears that the military has been giving up its 
institutional neutrality in favor of the ruling party. This is understood as the most viable 
option to protect the military from undue interference for partisan purposes but not as the 
expression of a certain party preference. This helped to improve civil-military relations, at 
least between the ruling party and the armed forces, since the relationship between 
civilians and soldiers in general became increasingly tense because of the critical military 
activities against politicians between 2007 and 2008. Since the elections, there has no 
longer been any indication of formal or informal military influence in elite recruitment. It 
seems that there is also a change in the degree of civilian control in internal security. On 25 
and 26 February 2009 at Philkhana (Dhaka) a mutiny of the Para-military Bangladesh 
Border Rifles (BRD) was staged. During the violent clashes, numerous commanding 
officers (including their families) of the armed forces deployed at the BDR were killed. The 
“Philkhana crisis” must not only be seen as an indication that civilians are in charge of the 
decision-making process regarding internal securitycxxxi but also as a pacesetter for future 
civil-military relations. Most remarkably for civil-military relations is the fact that the military 
followed the decision of the prime minister not to intervene (besides some limited 
exchange of gunfire). It was the first time in the history of the country that the armed forces 
were not allowed to take control in a serious internal law and order situation. The soldiers 
who were seriously looking for revenge and to oppress the mutiny violently also accepted 
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the initial civilian offer of general amnesty for the mutineers if they surrendered. The 
solution was primarily negotiated by the home minister following the directives of the prime 
minister with the BDR rebelscxxxii. The fact that it was made possible that the rebels were 
allowed to surrender to the police underlines the powerful position of civilians during the 
BDR crisis. Also, that the BDR members who were accused of crimes against civilians in 
the mutiny were taken to trial--a separate civilian court--indicates that civilians were in 
control of the situation.  
This has helped to institutionalize civilian control in various ways: First, it will restore the 
authority of the MHA over the Para-military BDR. To emphasize the subordination under 
MHA, the BDR was subsequently renamed the Border Guards Bangladesh and endowed 
with new symbols. Second, the inclusion of the MHA in the decision-making process will 
not only improve transparency but also broaden the civilian control mechanism which was 
before limited to the exclusive position of the PM and its interaction with the COAS. 
However, besides this decentralization of decision-making, the prime minister will remain at 
the centre of decision-making since the MHA is under his/her control. Third, the cause of 
the mutiny was not only about payment but also to express resentment by “the 
paramilitaries over the practice of appointing army officers to head the BDR”cxxxiii. This 
would weaken the possibility of the military to influence other security forces e.g. RAB, 
police) through deployed army personnel in future.  
Additionally, civilians established control over public policy. For example they were able to 
remove the 5th and 7th amendments, enforced by military rules, to legalize their actions. In 
consequence, there will be no more constitutional cover for any military takeover in the 
future. Moreover, civilians restored the secular principle of the 1972 constitution, which was 
diluted by military rulers to carry out the Islamization of the country (especially via the 8th 
Amendment). Most important is to mention that the civilian government was already 
planning to remove the respective amendments before the last caretaker government. The 
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fact that they are now able (via the Supreme Court) to implement this, e.g. the High Court 
verdict from 2005 which declared the 5th Amendment illegal to the constitution, also proved 
that there is a significant growth in civilian power vis-à-vis the military.  
In order to gain this control, the current government has basically focused on four 
strategies: appeasement, appreciation, ascriptive selection and acquiescence. First, the 
prime minister successfully chose and installed Lieutenant General Mohammad Abdul 
Mubeen in June 2009 as new COAS. Mubeen proved himself to be loyal to the prime 
minister in convincing soldiers to follow the orders of the prime minister not to intervene 
and thus allow civilians to negotiate the end of the rebellion. However, to appease the 
armed forces, the government announced that the rebels who were not part of the army 
were still likely to be prosecuted under military lawcxxxiv. Furthermore, in order to avoid a 
confrontation with the armed forces, which were still grumbling over their losses during the 
BDR mutiny, the civilian government increased the defence budget. Additionally, the 
government spent substantial efforts to buy sophisticated weapons and modernize the 
military. As a means of regaining control over the Chittagong Hill Tracts region, civilians 
appreciated the role of the armed forces in order to implement the 1997 peace accord as 
well as hand over the management of Chittagong seaport to the military. To maintain the 
fine balance between keeping the army content as well as subordinated to the government, 
the prime minister has used almost every opportunity to speak favorably about the armed 
forces and appreciate their contribution to safeguard democracy, the welfare of the people, 
and independence and sovereignty of the country. 
 
Civil-Military Relations and the Quality of Democracy 
 
Generally, Bangladesh’s democratic institutions perform their functionscxxxv, but have been 
hampered by various political-cultural factors. This is exemplified by the arch-rivalry 
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between the major parties, a de-constructive relationship between government and 
opposition, boycott of the parliament as a forum for political debates and decision-making, 
and political parties under autocratic leadershipcxxxvi. Consequently political institutions 
remain weak, institutionalization of civilian controls remains low, and the military has 
asserted an eminent role in politics which was particularly entrenched during the last 
caretaker government (2007-2008). Therefore, the armed forces remain as a major 
stakeholder in the political system of Bangladeshcxxxvii which led among other reasons to 
the state of emergency during the recent caretaker government. Nevertheless, Bangladesh 
has maintained its status as an electoral democracy, as proved in the free and fair 
elections of 2008cxxxviii. In this context one can state that military support for various 
caretaker governments in holding elections had some significant impacts on the stability of 
the political system and in preventing chaos and anarchy produced by the self-interest of 
civilian leadership and a dysfunctional political party system. However until now it did not 
help to strengthen civilian institutions. In other words, the military created a situation in 
which the civilian institutions were able to carry out their basic function but remained weak. 
Having this in mind, one can argue that the role of the military in the electoral process has 
provided, in the short run, some kind of systemic stability. Nevertheless, the creation of 
loosely-institutionalized political parties by military rulers also enforced the entrenchment of 
dynastic rule, nepotism and personal loyalty within political parties in the long term 
perspective. In this context, one can also argue that the democratic process was hindered 
due to the inability of many political parties to generate qualified leadership. There are two 
main reasons for this. First, the armed forces frequently interfered into politics and there 
were long periods of military rule which prevented continuity in the exercise of democratic 
norms and procedures; second, the dysfunctional political party system, which is a derivate 
from non-democratic structures and poor party organization. Generally one can state that 
the political system of Bangladesh is characterized by a lack of checks-and-balances and 
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that the level of armed forces accountability remains low. This led to a situation in which the 
misuse of power was rather the norm than the exception, marked by a growing nexus of 
military interference in law and order situations combined with ignorance towards human 
rights and weak democratic institutionscxxxix. Also, civil liberties were seriously constricted 
during the last caretaker government through various provisions which gave far-reaching 
powers to law enforcement agenciescxl. The suspension of all political activities had a deep 
impact on the democratic development of the countrycxli. Even until today, rules and 
restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association in combination with its 
random and selective application have created an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear 
among politicians of all political colors. Nevertheless, the situation is gradually improving 
“due to the installation of a new elected civilian government and related gains in 
government functioning and accountability”cxlii. In the context of the military-
organized ’clean-up’ of the political landscape, around 200,000 people were arrested on 
charges of political or financial corruptioncxliii. At the same time, extraordinary human rights 
violations by the security forces were reported. However, the persistent and widespread 
use of preventive detention without charge or trial, numbers of extra-judicial killings and 
tortures etc. is not new for Bangladeshis. But the fact that immunity for violation of civil 
rights through the law enforcement personnel was granted by an elected civilian 
government has been a serious aberration in the process of democratic consolidationcxliv. 
Hence, today Bangladesh remains a fragile democracy. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the final analysis, civil-military relations in Bangladesh have tended to be affected by 
historical, mutually-affecting legacies of civilian polarisation as well as military factionalism 
and politicisation, which have contributed to only a rudimentary level of institutionalization 
and a predominance of informality. Significantly, the increase of civilian control in the last 
two decades has not necessarily derived from the use of civilian strategies directed to 
institutionalize control. Instead, civilians preferred to establish mechanisms of personal 
control over the military. Nevertheless, the first process of decentralization, e.g. including 
the MHA, the demand of external donors for democratic reforms, as well as the concerns 
of the military about its international reputation as a loyal agent of the state made civilian 
control in general possible.  
To sum up, until the recent return to democracy in 2008, Bangladesh’s political culture 
ensured that any attempts to establish civilian control were personalized in nature rather 
than institutionalized. However, one can contend that at the very beginning of the initial 
period in 1971 the military did not act as an agent which was necessarily against the 
establishment of civilian control. However, this changed dramatically after soldiers 
experienced control efforts during the first period of civilian rule in 1971-1972. The rigorous 
application of robust strategies was seen as an essential threat towards the corporate 
interests of the armed forces. As a consequence, the military resisted any notion of civilian 
supremacy until the re-introduction of parliamentary democracy in 1990. However, as a 
result of a vibrant and politically aware civil society, democratic rule as well as another 
change for the institutionalization of civilian control is made possible again in 1990. All 
governments since then have carried out various attempts to gain control over the military. 
Several institutions regarding the establishment of civilian control were discussed and 
proposed in this regard. However, civilians’ preference for personalized supremacy, as well 
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as the high degree of politicization and polarization between the civilian leaders in 
establishing any change in civil-military relations led to a partial failure in institutionalizing 
civilian control in Bangladesh.  
In retrospect, internal factionalism allowed the armed forces to again become vulnerable to 
the partisan interests of politicians. However, one most crucial alteration can be identified 
in the context of the applied civilian strategies. With the causal conditions of the first period 
of military rule in mind, civilians today have realised that the application of strategies which 
tend to be overly robust has provoked military backslashes (as in 1975 or more recently in 
the context of the military backed caretaker government). As such, civilians have been 
inclined to increasingly choose a mixture of robust and weak strategies. But civilians have 
been more clearly focused upon weaker strategies, which have meant that these civilians 
have sought to manipulate the military for their political goals, and simultaneously, to avoid 
military backlashes, have tried to appease as well as acquiesce to soldiers’ autonomous 
activities. Ultimately, as long as civil-military relations are interpreted by certain civilians in 
the context their partisan interests, the institutionalization of civilian control and the 
consolidation of democracy in Bangladesh will remain in crisis. 
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